Evaluating and Improving Item Response Theory Models for Cross-National Expert Surveys by Pemstein, Daniel et al.
I N S T I T U T E
Evaluating and Improving Item Response
Theory Models for Cross-National
Expert Surveys
Daniel Pemstein, Eitan Tzelgov 
and Yi-ting Wang
Working Paper 
SERIES 2015:1 
THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE 
March 2015
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to the conceptualization and 
measurement of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and 
University of Notre Dame. With a V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg that 
comprises almost ten staff members, and a project team across the world with four 
Principal Investigators, fifteen Project Managers, 30+ Regional Managers, 170 Country 
Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 2,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one 
of the largest-ever social science research-oriented data collection programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
V-Dem Institute 
Department of Political Science  
University of Gothenburg 
Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711 
SE 40530 Gothenburg 
Sweden 
E-mail: contact@v-dem.net 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V-Dem Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.   
Copyright © 2015 by authors. All rights reserved. 
 
! 1!
Evaluating and Improving Item Response Theory Models 
for Cross-National Expert Surveys∗ 
 
 
 
Daniel Pemstein 
North Dakota State University 
 
Eitan Tzelgov 
University of Gothenburg 
 
Yi-Ting Wang 
National Cheng Kung University !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*The authors would like to thank Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, and the other members of the V-Dem team for helpful 
suggestions.  This research was supported, in part, by National Science Foundation Grant SES-1423944, PI: Daniel 
Pemstein, and by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University 
of Gothenburg, Sweden. 
! 2!
Abstract 
 
The data produced by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project contains ordinal ratings of a 
multitude of country-level indicators across space and time, with multiple experts providing 
judgments for each country-year observation. We use an ordinal item response theory (O-IRT) 
model to aggregate multiple experts' ratings. The V-Dem data provide a challenging domain for such 
models because they exhibit little cross-national bridging. That is, few coders provide ratings for 
multiple countries, making it difficult to calibrate the scales of estimates cross-nationally. In this 
paper, we provide a systematic analysis of the issue of bridging. We first use simulations to explore 
how much bridging one needs to achieve scale identification when coders' thresholds vary across 
countries and when the latent traits of some countries lack variation. We then examine how 
posterior predictive checks can be used to check cases of extent of scale non-comparability. Finally, 
we develop and evaluate search algorithms designed to select bridges that are most likely allow one 
to correct scale incompatibility problems. 
 
 !
Latent concepts are ubiquitous in political science. The study of political systems, poli-
cies, and belief systems requires careful theorizing and exploration of concepts that are not
directly measurable. In particular, constructs such as level of democracy, extent of human
rights, and ideology are all latent qualities that we cannot observe directly. Nonetheless,
social scientists have theoretical reasons to work with measures of such latent constructs and
core questions in our disciplines are virtually impossible to tackle if we restrict the objects
of our analyses to concrete observables. Therefore, we often rely on the subjective judgment
of experts to provide measures of latent traits.
Of course, there are many ways to leverage expert knowledge for concept measurement.
One approach places substantial faith in a small number of experts. For instance, one might
use one specialist, or a small panel of judges, who jointly code the set of observations, say
polities (Marshall & Gurr 2011). This strategy assumes that a small group of experts have
access to the knowledge and information necessary to adequately measure latent traits across
the population of interest. Not surprisingly, this assumption may be di cult to meet in cross-
national studies where detailed local knowledge is necessary to adequately assess concepts.
Thus, in cross-national research, it is common to distribute the load over a large number
of experts, and ask each specialist to code a single unit, say a party’s election manifesto
(Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge & McDonald 2006). Ideally, this strategy draws from
a cross-national pool of experts that can leverage local knowledge to produce detailed and
valid measures.
This measurement strategy relaxes the assumption that a small group of experts can
evaluate many units, but has the potential to generate di↵erential assessments across units
because it implicitly assumes that experts’ understandings of concepts are identical. In
other words, these approaches simply assume that each coder is able to produce a valid
point-estimate of the latent concept at hand.1 Multiple raters may have quite di↵erent un-
derstandings of latent concepts and this variation in conceptualization may be especially
1Klingemann et al. (2006) are a somewhat inappropriate example here, because they attempt to train
their raters to maximize inter-coder reliability.
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exacerbated when experts hail from varying cultural and educational traditions. Indeed, in
the context of party manifestos, Konig, Marbach & Osnabrugge (2013) show that expert
ratings exhibit substantial cross-national bias. More generally, people with varying back-
grounds are likely to apply di↵erent standards when rating concepts (King & Wand 2006).
For example, consider the task of rating the extent of media freedom in a country, using a
Likert scale running from zero (no freedom) to five (complete freedom). If experts in coun-
try A—perhaps because of a long history of freedom of expression—hold media freedom to
higher standards than those in country B, then country A expert thresholds will be higher
than those of their counterparts. Even within countries, experts standards may di↵er. And,
varying standards aside, research shows that people’s responses to Likert scales vary system-
atically across cultures (Lee, Jones, Mineyama & Zhang 2002). Thus, measurement e↵orts
that rely on cross-national teams of experts need to take the possibility of varying standards
seriously.
Both of the aforementioned strategies place substantial faith in each individual expert,
and—because they generate only one estimate per observation—provide little leverage over
potential measurement uncertainty. In essence, therefore, they assume that the expert rat-
ings that they rely upon are error-free, or at least highly reliable.2 Expert surveys, where
more than one expert provides a rating of each observation, allow researches to relax this reli-
ability assumption and, at least potentially, produce estimates of measurement error (Bakker,
de Vries, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Marks, Polk, Rovny, Steenbergen & Vachudova forthcom-
ing, Fish & Kroenig 2009, Kitschelt 2013). With these approaches, however, aggregating
coders’ opinion becomes an issue. In most cases these studies focus on measures of cen-
tral tendency, and ignore precision, or, at best, provide simple summaries of variation in
expert codes. Moreover, this approach does little to alleviate concerns about cross-expert
equivalency; there is no way of knowing whether experts have the same scale in mind when
they provide their codings. For example, we do not know if a Hungarian specialist defines
2Although many of these projects do attempt to verify the inter-coder reliability of their experts or coding
teams.
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extreme-right political parties in the same way that a Swedish expert might. While expert
surveys typically use carefully worded questions that are designed to minimize conceptual
slipping, there remains a substantial risk that experts in di↵erent contexts might interpret
coding rules in systematically di↵erent ways.
A more sophisticated approach to aggregating expert ratings explicitly models the mea-
surement process, typically using item response theory (IRT) methods developed by scholars
of educational testing (see e.g. Clinton & Lapinski 2006, Clinton & Lewis 2007, Treier &
Jackman 2008, Pemstein, Meserve & Melton 2010, Linzer & Staton 2012, Konig, Marbach
& Osnabrugge 2013, Schnakenberg & Fariss 2014, Fariss 2014). These models relax two
key assumptions implicitly made by traditional approaches to aggregating ratings in expert
surveys. First, they allow for variation in rater precision. Second, they allow raters to adopt
di↵ering standards of conceptualization. In particular, when raters provide ordinal (Likert
scale) ratings of a particular concept, these methods allow for the possibility that di↵erent
experts have varying thresholds for placing observations into particular categories within the
scale. Finally, because IRT methods are grounded in an explicit model of the rating pro-
cess, they both aggregate information provided by multiple experts and produce reasoned
estimates of uncertainty around aggregate point estimates.
However, these tools are not immune to the problems that plague other strategies for
measuring latent social science concepts cross-nationally. In particular, while these methods
can, in principle, deal with variation in how experts perceive latent traits, common patterns
of data collection in comparative politics—in particular, using disjoint sets of coders across
countries—make it di cult for researchers to use IRT models to produce cross-nationally
comparable measures of latent concepts. Thus, a persistent problem in the use of these
methods has been the issue of calibration/comparability, or lack of bridging. Since in many
cases the same latent concept is being measured for di↵erent units and/or in di↵erent times, it
is vital to identify bridges who cross disjoint sets of coders and provide information necessary
to calibrate coder thresholds across units. In our context, these are experts who are capable
5
of rating more than one country. This problem is analogous to that faced by researchers
who use IRT methods to estimate ideology from roll call votes and who wish to create
common space measures across institutions (McCarty & Poole 1995, Bailey 2007, Shor &
McCarty 2011) or within institutions across time (Poole & Rosenthal 1997, Groseclose, Levitt
& Snyder 1999, Martin & Quinn 2002). Yet, we have little understanding of exactly how much
bridging is necessary to achieve scale equivalency across units, and recent work has called
into question the extent to which existing common spaces actually achieve scale identification
(Ho & Quinn 2011).
In this paper we provide a systematic analysis of the issue of bridging, motivated by the
Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) project. This project is, at its core, an expert-survey, in
which country experts provide ordinal ratings about dozens of democratic indicators (e.g.
barriers to parties, freedom of academic speech, civil society participation), for the 1900-
2012 period. The unit of analysis for each indicator is country-year, for which at least five
coders provide ratings. A major selling point of the project is its reliance on a mix of local
experts and foreign specialists; generally about half of the raters reside in the country that
they rate. But this focus on specialized knowledge comes at a cost; initial survey waves
almost exclusively asked experts to provide ratings for only a single country and the length
of the survey made both the creation and use of anchoring vignettes (King & Wand 2006)
impractical. Subsequent waves have focused on ‘bridge-coding,’ but the search for bridge
coders faces a number of practical limitations. First, the specificity of the survey3 means
that few potential raters have the ability to provide cross-national coding, especially for the
whole time period under consideration. Resources are also an important constraining factor
because recruiting bridge-coders and administering surveys is expensive. Thus the V-Dem
project faces a problem that is—or should be—generally applicable to a large class of cross-
national expert surveys: it needs to recruit bridge coders as e ciently as possible and to
evaluate when bridge coding is su cient to provide cross-nationally comparable estimates of
3Technically, surveys. V-Dem experts are partitioned into over ten specializations and each set of experts
completes a survey specific to her area of expertize.
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latent traits.
Thus, we seek to answer a set of key questions. First, if we adopt weak prior assumptions
about the structure of rater thresholds,4 how much bridging is necessary to achieve cross-
national comparability in a survey structured like V-Dem? Perhaps more importantly, how
do we know when we have enough bridges? Or, failing that, can we at least develop tools to
systematically identify cases for which scale comparability is likely to be a problem? Finally,
how can we most e ciently select bridges in order to obtain scale comparability across
countries? Or, in other words, what set of bridges are likely to provide such comparability
at the lowest cost to the project?
In the next section we describe the IRT model at the heart of this project. Next, we
illustrate the bridging problem in V-Dem and then use simulations to explore how much
bridging one needs to achieve scale identification when faced with two types of problems
that seem common in V-Dem, and probably plague many cross-national expert surveys of
social science concepts. We then examine how useful posterior predictive checks are for
identifying instances of scale non-comparability. Finally, we develop and evaluate a pair of
search algorithms designed to select bridges that are most likely to provide information, and
thus allow one to correct for, scale incompatibility problems.
1 An O-IRT Model for V-Dem Data
We need to introduce some notation to keep track of things because the complexity of the
V-Dem dataset, which contains ratings of a vast number of indicators across space and time.
Moreover, each indicator is rated by more than one judge. This means that there are
• i 2 I indicator variables,
4Weak priors allow raters to have widely varying thresholds. Very strong priors would assume, as most
projects involving cross-national expert surveys essentially do, that thresholds are identical across raters.
Middle-ground assumptions might maintain that same-country experts have identical, or very similar, thresh-
olds, or that raters with similar backgrounds—education, profession, and so forth—have similar thresholds
to one another.
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• r 2 R raters,
• c 2 C countries,
• and t 2 T = {1, . . . , t} time periods.
I is the set of indicator variables while i represents one element from that set, and so
on. Each of the |R| raters provides ratings of one or more of each of the |I| indicators
in some subset of the available n = |C| ⇥ |T | country-years covered by the dataset. Each
country enters the dataset at time tc and exits at time tc + 1. We’ll call rater r’s set of
observed ratings/judgments Jr. Each element of each of these judgment sets is an i, c, t
triple. Similarly, the set of raters that rated country-year c, t is Rct. In this paper we focus
on models for a single indicator, and therefore drop the i indices from our notation. We also
restrict our attention to the case where indicator i is ordinal.
For a given indicator we observe a sparse5 |C| ⇥ |T | ⇥ |R| array, y, of ordinal ratings.
While our observations are ordinal, we assume that raters make judgments about latent
continuous concepts. In particular, we assume that each rater first perceives latent values
with error, such that
y˜ctr = zct + ectr (1)
where zct is the “true” latent value of the given indicator in country c at time t, y˜ctr is
rater r’s perception of zct, and ectr is the error in rater r’s perception for the country-year
observation. For the cases that she judges (Jr), rater r places a country-year in category k
if ⌧r,k 1 < y˜ctr  ⌧r,k, where each ⌧ represents a rater cuto↵ point on the underlying latent
scale. The vector ⌧ r = (⌧r,1, . . . , ⌧r,K 1) is the vector of unobserved ranking cuto↵s for judge
r on the latent scale. We fix each ⌧r,0 =  1 and ⌧r,K = 1, where K is the number of
ordinal categories raters use to judge the indicator. For the moment, say the cumulative
5The majority of raters provide ratings for only one country.
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distribution function for the rating errors is
ectr ⇠ F (ectr/ r). (2)
Combining this assumption, and the assumptions about rater cuto↵s described in the above
paragraph, with equation 1 implies the following data generating process (DGP):
Pr(yctr = k) = Pr(y˜ctr > ⌧r,k 1 ^ y˜ctr  ⌧r,k)
= Pr(ectr > ⌧r,k 1   zct ^ ectr  ⌧r,k   zct)
= F
✓
⌧r,k   zct
 r
◆
  F
✓
⌧r,k 1   zct
 r
◆
= F ( r,k   zct r)  F ( r,k 1   zct r) .
(3)
The last two lines of equation 3 reflect two common parameterizations of this model.
The first parameterization is typically called multi-rater ordinal probit (MROP) (Johnson &
Albert 1999, Pemstein, Meserve & Melton 2010),6 while the latter is an ordinal item response
theory (O-IRT) setup (Clinton & Lewis 2007, Treier & Jackman 2008). Note, in particular,
that  r =
1
 r
and  r,k =
⌧r,k
 r
.7 The parameter  r is a measure of rater r’s reliability when
judging the indicator; specifically it represents the size of r’s typical errors. Raters with
small  r parameters are better, on average, at judging indicator i than are raters with large
 r parameters. In the IRT literature,  r is known as the discrimination parameter,8 while
each   is a di culty parameter. The discrimination parameter is a measure of precision; a
rater characterized by an item discrimination parameter close to zero will be largely unre-
sponsive to true indicator values when making judgments while a rater with a discrimination
parameter far from zero will be very “discriminating.” The   and ⌧ parameters are thresh-
olds that control how raters map their perceptions on the latent interval scale into ordinal
6If we assume F (·) is standard normal.
7This equivalency breaks down if we allow for  r parameters less than one. Thus, the O-IRT model is
potentially more general than MROP.
8Equation 3 makes clear that  r measures rater precision.
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classifications. The term “di culty parameter” stems from applications in educational test-
ing where the latent variable is ability and observed ratings are binary (in)correct answers
to test questions. The scale identification problem faced by cross-national surveys such as
V-Dem is driven by the fact that these   and ⌧ parameters may—and perhaps are even likely
to—vary across raters hailing from di↵erent cultural and educational backgrounds.
Completing the model specification requires adopting prior distributions for the model
parameters. We will focus on the O-IRT model here. Generally, one sets zct ⇠ N (0, 1) a
priori. This assumption (arbitrarily) sets the scale of the estimated latent traits. Second,
one assumes  r ⇠ T N (µ r ,   r , 0,1).9 Finally, while di↵erent authors adopt varying priors
for  r,k, it is possible to adopt completely uninformative uniform priors for these parameters,
subject to the constraint that they remain ordered within raters. When one lacks any
bridging between sets of raters, such a prior will fail to identify the model. Or, in other
words, under such a prior, the model lacks su cient information to set the relative placement
of disjoint (with respect to cases rated) sets of rater thresholds, and, in turn, latent trait
estimates. Thus, we adopt vaguely informative priors for the  r,k parameters throughout.
At its heart, this model does three things. First, it takes ordinal observations and maps
raters’ thresholds onto a single interval-valued latent variable. In other words, it provides a
reasoned way to deal with a relatively large class of di↵erences in how individual respondents
interpret Likert scales. Second, it allows raters to vary in how reliably they make judgments,
but largely assumes away the potential for systematic rater biases that are not covered
by varying thresholds.10 This latter point is easiest to see in the MROP version of the
model. Specifically, in a standard MROP, one assumes F (·) is standard normal, such that
ectr = N (0,  2r). So, in other words, raters get things right on average, but they make
91 is a common choice for mu r . One typically chooses a large value for   r , thereby adopting a vague
prior. The assumption of truncation at zero equates to assuming that raters agree on which direction is up.
While reasonable in our context, this assumption is inappropriate when one uses IRT models to estimate
ideology from voting behavior.
10For instance, the model cannot account for a rater that applies one set of thresholds to one country and
a di↵erent set to another. Nor does this model capture the possibility that rater precisions might vary over
space and time, although the model might be expanded to handle such issues.
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stochastic mistakes where the typical magnitude of mistakes that rater r makes on indicator
i is  2r . So, if  
2
r <  
2
r0 then rater r provides more reliable judgments about z than r
0 because
she makes smaller mistakes on average. Finally, taking di↵erences in rater thresholds and
precisions into account, the model produces interval-valued estimates of latent traits—each
zct—accompanied by estimates of measurement error that reflect both the level disagreement
between coders on the case in question, and the estimated precision of the coders who rated
the case.
2 The Bridge Problem
In practice, we face two related problems when attempting to use O-IRT models to generate
cross-nationally comparable estimates of latent traits using the V-Dem data. The general
problem, of course, is that, if we choose not to simply assume that raters share similar
thresholds,11 we cannot establish the cross-national comparability of our estimates. And,
because the scale of the model is established by the vague prior on the zct parameters, we
know that, in the absence of any bridging, the scale location of scores within countries
will be set relative to the empirical pattern of codes provided by raters. If country traits
are highly variable and generated randomly from the same distribution, then scales would
tend to converge even without bridging, but real traits do not look remotely like a random,
highly variable, process. Furthermore, whether or not bridging observations establish scale
convergence relies not just on whether or not we have many bridges, but on how bridging
observations correspond to empirical patterns in the data. In other words, some bridges are
more informative than others and certain countries are much harder to align with a common
scale than others. Indeed, our second primary concern is that empirical patterns in regime
traits often exacerbate the fundamental scale equivalence problem.
While it is, in general, di cult, to determine whether two cases are su ciently bridged to
11And fitting O-IRT models to single-country series provides substantial evidence that rater thresholds
vary, even within countries.
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obtain scale equivalence, sometimes the lack of su cient bridging is painfully obvious. When
we naively apply O-IRT models to weakly bridged V-dem data, we consistently produce
estimates of latent values for Western-European countries that are lower than for countries
in which experts codings’ on the original Likert scales point to serious democratic deficiencies.
This finding is largely a result of two trends in our data. First, coders of Western, established
democracies exhibit low variation in their coding. An example of this issue is presented in
Figure 1. The top two panels present the yearly average ratings for Denmark on the original
ordinal scale for V-Dem’s barriers to parties indicator. Country experts clearly agree that
there are no barriers to parties in Denmark (higher scores reflect lower barriers), except
during a brief period in the 1940s. Contrast this result with the highly variable yearly
average of this variable for Mali, shown in the top right panel of the figure. The two bottom
panels present the result of fitting an O-IRT model, like that described in section 1, to
around 150 countries worth of ratings containing few cross-national bridges. While the
measurement model results for Mali reflect its transition to a “no barriers” mode (as the
zct estimates cross the upper threshold),12 the measurement model estimates for Denmark
never cross the upper threshold. Thus, even though the country experts agree that the
situation with regards to parties’ barriers is flawless in Denmark, the lack of variation in
ratings is problematic. Clearly, we lack su cient bridges to place Denmark and Mali on
the same scale. Moreover, a reasonable interpretation of the Danish data is that, because
every rater agrees that Denmark rates very highly on this trait in every time period, we have
should place Denmark near the top of the common scale with high confidence. But, once
we relax the assumption that thresholds have consistent meanings across raters, country
time-series like Denmark provide virtually no information about scores, because we have no
way to nail down what Danish thresholds mean relative to one another, or to coders in other
countries.13 Furthermore, while cases that exhibit su cient variation to produce estimates
12Thresholds in these graphs reflect population means for the  r,k parameters.
13This problem is akin to the issue pointed out by Spirling and McLean (2007), who argue that the
optimal classification algorithm places extreme members of the UK parliament at the center of the ideological
spectrum because of perfect ideological voting of these MPs.
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Figure 1: Raw ratings and measurement model results for barriers to parties indicator.
that span their local scales may look comparable on visual inspection, without su cient
bridging it is impossible to establish the comparability of country time-series, even when
they provide substantial information about coder thresholds within countries.
3 A Simulation-Based Examination of Bridging
3.1 Thresholds Drawn from the Same Distribution
To evaluate the e↵ects of bridging on model fit, cross-national comparability and identi-
fication, we preform a number of Monte Carlo experiments. Our first set of experiments
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examines the “Swiss,” or constant-country problem. These experiments, which examine
scale equivalence between two simulated “countries,” proceed as follows:
1. We generate “true” values for each zct, which represent real country-year latent ability
scores. In order to proxy the countries we observe in the V-dem dataset, we focus on
two country ‘types.’ The first is what we call a ‘constant’ country (used as proxies
for Western-European countries). To simulate these countries, we draw latent ability
scores zconstantct ⇠ N (1.8, .05). In addition, we generate latent ability scores for countries
we dub ‘random.’ These are countries in which coders’ ratings exhibit a high degree
of variation, and thus provide us with a substantial information regarding coders’
thresholds. These scores are drawn from a zrandomct ⇠ N (0, 1) distribution.14
2. We also generate |R| ⇥K coders’ thresholds,  r,k. The first threshold,  r,1, is drawn
from a N ( 1.5, 0.2) distribution. Additional three,  r,k=(2,...,4) are drawn sequentially
from normal distributions with means (-5., .5, 1) and standard deviation 0.2. For
each threshold, we truncate the prior from below by the mean of the k   1 threshold.
Note that, while we allow rater thresholds to vary, the fact that we draw them from
identical distributions will tend to minimize the role that such variation plays in scale
equivalence. Thus, we focus attention on the issue that constant countries pose in
these experiments.
3. To complete the latent data, we generate coders’ discrimination parameters such that
 r ⇠ T N (1, 3, 0,1) distribution.
4. Given the above simulated parameters, we use equation 3 to simulate observed ratings
data.
For our purposes, bridge-coding is defined as a situation where a coder who ‘originally’
codes one country (for example, an expert of British politics, rating only the UK), also pro-
14Throughout the paper we use the term constant country to denote the country whose latent ability scores
were drawn from a N (1.8, .05) distribution, and ‘random country’ to denote a N (0, 1) country. Random
countries are, of course, an ideal type never actually realized in the V-Dem data.
14
vides ratings for an additional country. As for our stylized, simulated datasets, we generally
begin with ‘baseline’ data, in which we simulate data for two countries, over a period of 100
years. This baseline dataset includes five coders who provide ratings only for one country,
and five who provide ratings for the other. This is a ‘no-bridging’ scenario. In order to
simulate bridge coding, we choose a number of coders from only one country, and simulate
their ratings for the other. We do this gradually, starting with only one bridge coder, and up
until we have ‘full-bridging.’ This is a situation where all five coders from a given country
also provide ratings for the other.
We begin our evaluation of the e↵ects of bridging on the mean square error (MSE)
between the model’s estimates and the real latent scores. Bridge-coding is simulated for the
entire period (100 years). The results of these simulations are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The
figure is divided into sub-regions, capturing the di↵erent levels of simulated bridge coding
(e.g., the left sub-region is a ‘no-bridging’ scenario, and in the fourth, there are three coders
from the first country who also rate the second). We replicated each experiment across ten
simulated datasets. The figures demonstrate that full time-series bridging, done either from
the constant to the random country or vice versa, results in a rapid improvement in terms of
MSE. Most strikingly, once we simulate one bridge coder, the MSE values for both country
types decrease from approximately 1 to 0.3 (in the constant country), and approximately
0.85 to 0.2 (random). Once we add more bridge coders MSE values are further reduced, and
reach a plateau of approximately 0.15-2 for constant countries and 0.1-0.15 for the random
country with 3-5 bridge coders.
To assess the impact of the quantity of bridge coding on MSE, we repeat these experi-
ments with one minor modification. Instead of simulating bridging for the entire period, we
limit our bridging to only 10 years. Figures 4 and 5 summarize the results of these experi-
ments. The trends visible in these figures are very similar to those shown in Figures 2 and
3. Specifically, it is clear that bridging brings about a substantive reduction in MSE. The
magnitude of the reduction seems to be proportional to the amount of bridge coding.
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10 relevant simulations.
Figure 2: Evaluation of bridging from constant to random countries–mean square error of
latent scores
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a random to a constant country. Bridge coding is done for the entire time
period (100 years). The vertical lines divide the figure into the bridging patterns, from a no-bridging to full-bridging (i.e. all
coders from the constant country also code the random country). In each section of the figure, points represent the MSE for
10 relevant simulations.
Figure 3: Evaluation of bridging from random to constant countries–mean square error of
latent scores
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a constant to a random country. Bridge coding is done for 10 years. The
vertical lines divide the figure into the bridging patterns, from a no-bridging to full-bridging (i.e. all coders from the constant
country also code the random country). In each section of the figure, points represent the MSE for 10 relevant simulations.
Figure 4: Evaluation of bridging from constant to random countries (10 years of bridging)–
mean square error of latent scores
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a random to a constant country. Bridge coding is done for 10 years. The
vertical lines divide the figure into the bridging patterns, from a no-bridging to full-bridging (i.e. all coders from the constant
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Figure 5: Evaluation of bridging from random to constant countries (10 years of bridging)–
mean square error of latent scores
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a constant to a random country. Bridge coding is done for the entire time
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coders from the constant country also code the random country). In each section of the figure, points represent the coverage
for 10 relevant simulations.
Figure 6: Evaluation of bridging from constant to random countries–95% coverage
The second criterion we use to evaluate the e↵ects of bridging is the percentage of the
latent ability scores zct which are covered by 95% of the model’s posterior latent scores
estimates (coverage). Examination of the Figures 6-7 reveals that regardless of the direction
of bridging, even one bridge coder (for the entire period) increases the coverage rates to
approximately 90%-100%. This rapid improvement is contrasted with the slow improvement
we see in coverage when we limit our bridging to only 10 years (see Figures 8-9). This result
has important implications for the V-Dem project’s approach to recruiting bridge coders to
solve the constant country problem. In particular, we are likely to benefit far more from
recruiting a small number of bridge coders to code full time series across constant and varying
countries than we are from asking many coders to rate limited cross-sections.
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a constant to a random country. Bridge coding is done for the entire time
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Figure 7: Evaluation of bridging from random to constant countries–95% coverage
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a constant to a random country. Bridge coding is done for a 10 year
period. The vertical lines divide the figure into the bridging patterns, from a no-bridging to full-bridging (i.e. all coders from
the constant country also code the random country). In each section of the figure, points represent the coverage for 10 relevant
simulations.
Figure 8: Evaluation of bridging from random to constant countries–95% coverage
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Figure 9: Evaluation of bridging from random to constant countries–95% coverage
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Next we turn to direct comparisons between the model’s parameters and the generated
data. We begin by inspecting the zct parameters. By examining this we hope to assess the
degree to which lack of variation in latent scores a↵ects model fit, and the extent to which
bridging helps alleviate potential issues. Before preforming these direct comparisons, we
follow Bafumi et. al (2005) and and rescale the model’s fitted values so that they have the
same mean and standard deviation as the original latent scores. To present these comparisons
systematically, we plot the generated country latent scores against the model’s z parameters
in Figures 10 and 11. The first thing noticeable in Figure 10 is that the estimates for the
constant countries (in red) cluster in two distinct areas. One cluster is located close to the
45 degree line, and one below it.15 In addition, the results of the baseline model (upper left
panel in both figures) indicate that the model tends to over-predict the latent scores for the
random country. This is a result of the relativity of the latent scales and our decision to
mean-center estimates to aid in comparability; the rotation of the latent traits is arbitrary.
Focusing on Figure 10, we see that the quantity of bridge coding has a strong e↵ect on
model fit. Bridging pulls both the over predicted and the under predicted (constant) values
toward the 45 degree line. Much like in previous diagnostics, this process is gradual. In
the simulation in which all five coders from the constant country also code the random one
(lower-right panel), the estimates for the random county are almost entirely clustered on the
45 degree line (apart from a number of outliers at the extremes of the distribution). Under
this scenario, the estimates from the constant country are also closer to the 45 degree line.
The results presented in Figure 11 match closely with those observed in Figure 10. How-
ever, closer inspection of our results reveals that when the bridge coding is done from the
constant country to the random one, the fit of the model is improved. As can be seen in
Table 1, the MSE for both random and constant countries are lower for constant-random
bridging than for random-constant bridging. This result makes a lot of sense because, prior
to bridge coding the model knows a lot less about the thresholds of raters in the constant
15This looks suspiciously like a multiple-modes problem. A similar pattern does not appear when we use
variational approximation to estimate the O-IRT model. Here we use Hamiltonian Monte Carlo.
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a constant to a random country. The upper left panel presents the results
for the baseline mode (no bridging). Points depict the results of per simulations per regime (no bridging, one bridge coder, two
bridge coders, etc.)
Figure 10: Fitted and real latent score estimates. Bridging is from constant to random
countries
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Note: The figure shows the e↵ects of bridging from a random to a constant country. The upper left panel presents the results
for the baseline mode (no bridging). Points depict the results of per simulations per regime (no bridging, one bridge coder, two
bridge coders, etc.)
Figure 11: Fitted and real latent score estimates. Bridging is from random to constant
countries
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Table 1: Sums of Mean Square Error
constant country random country
c-r bridging
1.13 0.60
(0.01) (0.009)
r-c bridging
1.60 0.97
(0.009) (0.01)
Note: Sums of mean square errors for model including full bridging pattern (bottom-right panels of Figures
10 and 11) . c-r bridging implies that coders from constant countries also code random the country. r-c
stands for the opposite pattern.
country than it does about those in the random country. In terms of bridge-rater recruit-
ment strategy, we see that we stand to obtain greater benefit from asking “Swiss” coders to
code cases with substantial variation than we do from recruiting coders with well-estimated
threshold values to code constant cases.
We now turn to inspecting model fit with regards to the coders’ thresholds parameters
 j,k. As in the previous examples, we compare patterns and quantity of bridging, how
these a↵ect the model’s predictions, and their relationship with the latent generated data.
Figures 12 and 13 summarize these experiments. As always, the no-bridging scenarios yields
estimates that are biased. Specifically, the threshold parameters of coders who only rate
the random country are over-predicted, while those of coders who only code the constant
country are under-predicted. As can be seen in Figure 12, increasing the degree of bridging
from the constant to the random country reduces the bias, as more and more of the points
fall closer to the 45 degree line. In addition, it is clear that even without a large degree
of bridging, the lower thresholds of the constant coders are estimated with minimal bias.16
Overall, even with full bridging (i.e. when all coders from the constant country also code the
random country), there is still bias in the estimates of coders’ thresholds. Examination of
figure 13 highlights the extent of this issue. The figure shows that when the bridging pattern
is from the random to the constant country, bridging has little e↵ect on the bias with which
16We simulate the constant country such that coders almost give it a perfect, high score. This minimal
information is su cient to estimate the location of the lowest threshold with little bias, but not of other
thresholds.
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Figure 12: Fitted and real thresholds’ estimates. Bridging is from constant to random
countries.
these parameters are estimated.
In addition, the lower thresholds of the coders who are originally from the constant
country (depicted at the upper panels of Figure 12 in blue dots and in the bottom panels in
red, as we simulate more and more bridge coding), are estimated with minimal bias when
we simulate full bridging17
3.2 Thresholds Drawn from Di↵erent Distributions
We now turn our attention to situations where latent traits exhibit substantial variation
within countries but coders across countries have significantly di↵erent thresholds. To simu-
late the situation where coders from di↵erent countries have di↵erent thresholds, we generate
the coders’ thresholds drawn from di↵erent distributions. For the “low threshold” coders,
17That is, a situation where all countries from country A also code country B.
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Figure 13: Fitted and real thresholds’ estimates. Bridging is from random to constant
countries.
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the means of their k thresholds,  lowµ,k , are drawn from a N ( 1, .5) distribution. These coders
are able to discriminate between lower-valued latent scores, but lump high latent values into
their top ordinal category. For the “high threshold” coders, the means of their k thresholds,
 highµ,k , are drawn from a N (1, .5) distribution, subject to the ordering constraint. These
coders are less able to discriminate low latent traits. This simulates a country where coders
consistently tend to be more harsh on their evaluations of the country’s level of political
development. These two sets of coders rate two “random” countries, for which the latent
scores are both drawn from a N (0, 1) distribution. The parameters of coders’ discrimination
are generated from the same distribution as in the previous simulation. We also follow the
same data generating process to simulate coders’ observed ordinal ratings for a hundred
years of two countries.
In the baseline (unbridged) model, five “low threshold” coders rate only one country,
while the five “high threshold” coders code the other country. Then we evaluate the e↵ects
of bridge-coding by simulating either “low threshold” or “high threshold” coders’ ratings
for the other country for the entire period. The MSE of these simulations are shown in
Figure 14 and 15. Figure 14 and 15 demonstrate the e↵ects of bridging coding done by
“high threshold” and “low threshold” coders, respectively, on the MSE. The Figures suggest
that bridging, either done by the “high threshold” or “low threshold” coders, brings a rapid
improvement for the “bridged country.” However, the improvement for bridge coders’ original
country is not substantial. For example, when a “low threshold” coders does bridging coding
for the other country, it provides information about where thresholds of those “high” coders
are. In addition, the “high” coders’ are less able to distinguish between latent traits below
their lowest threshold, and the bridging coding helps solve this issue. Similarly, the “low”
coders cannot distinguish between latent traits above their highest threshold, but since none
of the “high” coders does bridging coding for the “low” coders’ country, those high latent
traits are still not accurately estimated.
Figures 16 and 17 more clearly illustrate the e↵ects of bridging coding on the country-
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Figure 14: Evaluation of bridging from a country with low coders’ thresholds to a country
with high coders’ thresholds, mean square error of latent scores.
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Figure 15: Evaluation of bridging from a country with high coders’ thresholds to a country
with low coders’ thresholds, mean square error of latent scores.
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Figure 16: Fitted and real latent score estimates. Bridging is from a random country with
low coders’ thresholds to a random country with high coders’ thresholds. Countries coded
by low threshold coders are represented by black dots. Countries coded by high threshold
coders are represented by red dots.
year estimates. The Figures show that in the baseline experiment, country-years coded by
the “low” coders (black dots) tend to be overestimated; while country-years coded by the
“high” coders (red dots) are likely to be underestimated. In addition, the high latent traits
in the “low” coders’ country are in general poorly estimated, and vice versa. The estimates
for both countries move toward the 45-degree line. However, for the bridging countries, the
high latent traits in the “low” coders’ country and the low latent traits in the “high” coders’
country are still poorly estimated.
In sum, these experiments imply that, when coders in di↵erent countries have significantly
di↵erent standards—when one set of coders is more strict than the other—we require bridges
in both directions to obtain scale equivalence. It also demonstrates that the information
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Figure 17: Fitted and real latent score estimates. Bridging is from a random country with
high coders’ thresholds to a random country with low coders’ thresholds. Countries coded
by low threshold coders are represented by black dots. Countries coded by high threshold
coders are represented by red dots.
34
provided by limited bridging does not filter through  r,k and zct estimates as rapidly as one
might intuitively expect. Of course these simulations are, in a sense, worst case, because the
cross-national threshold di↵erences that we examine here are severe. Nonetheless, because
we can not know how di↵erent coders thresholds are a priori, these simulations expose the
potential severity of the bridging problem.
4 Identifying Poorly Bridged Cases in Real Data
The simulations in the previous section starkly illustrate the scope of the bridging problem
and provide some intuitions about how to select bridges to best mitigate this issue. The
experiments with simulated data suggest that bridge rating helps solve the issues of “con-
stant” countries and di↵erent thresholds of di↵erent groups of coders. When the quantity
of bridge coding increases, the MSE between the country-year estimates and the simulated
latent scores decreases. But our ability to evaluate bridging quality in these simulations rests
on the fact that we know true latent values. To address these question with real data, we
need techniques for identifying poorly bridged cases from observable quantities.
This is a di cult problem because the question of whether two cases are su ciently
bridged is, at the limit, unknowable. Nonetheless, while we may not be able to develop a
test that establishes scale equivalence across sets of raters, we should be able to use the
bridges that we do have to identify cases where scale equivalence is unlikely. In particular,
our proposed approach uses in-sample posterior predictions from the model to test for poor
model fit in bridge observations. Consider a bridge rater based in arbitrary country—we will
call this bridge rater rb— who provides a rating yctrb = k for a case, ct, in another country.
Given model parameters, the posterior predicted probability of observing the bridge rating
yctrb = k is
p(yctrb = k| , z, ) =  ( rb,k   zct rc)   ( rb,k 1   zct rc).
A model that fits the data well should place relatively high probability on the outcome, k,
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that we actually observe. More importantly, all else equal,18 a model that exhibits scale
equivalence across countries should do a similarly good job of predicting ratings by bridge
raters as it does predicting ratings by in-country raters. On the other hand, if scales vary
across countries, then the model should expect predict behavior by rb that is o↵ the mark,
and it should do a worse job of predicting rb’s ratings than it does predicting the ratings
of in-country raters of the bridged case. Scaling up, if we find that our posterior predictive
capability for bridge ratings substantially under-performs our ability to predict in-country
ratings for bridged cases, then we should be suspicious that the target country’s scale is out
of whack with those in the bridge raters’ countries.
Levering this logic, we calculate the posterior probability based on the point estimates
of  rb , zct, and  rc for each bridge codings,
19 and take the averages across all years and all
bridge coders within each bridged country to generate the country level probability p(ycb =
k). Focusing only on bridged observations, we also calculate the same posterior predicted
probability of observing yctrc for each each in-country rater rc, and then generate the country
level average for each bridged country, p(ycc = k). These average scores tell us how well the
model fits bridge raters relative to in-country raters for bridged cases. By focusing only on
bridged cases, we control for the degree of di culty inherent in predicting the cases that
happen to be bridged. For a bridged country c, if these two values are close to each other,
the model fit is similar across bridge and local raters for this country. Thus we have little
evidence of scale incompatibility. On the other hand, if the model fits bridge raters poorly,
relative to in-country coders, then we know that scale equivalence is unlikely.
It is important to note that such comparison cannot establish scale identification across
countries. Rather a small di↵erence between the posterior probabilities indicates only that
there is little evidence that the scale of measurement in country c is di↵erent than the
scales in the countries that supplied bridge raters for c. On the other hand, if the di↵erence
18Rater reliability, in particular.
19We also calculate a posterior distribution around the probability based on each draw from the model
posterior.
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Figure 18: Comparison of posterior predictive probabilities for in-country coders and bridge
coders. Bridging is from random country to constant country
is large, then the model is substantially worse at predicting how bridge raters will judge
country c than it at predicting how local rater behavior. There are a number of possible
reasons for such a finding. For instance, bridge coders might be less discriminating than
their in-country counterparts. But substantial di↵erences between how well the model fits
bridge codings and local codings of bridged cases can help researchers identify cases that are
unlikely to be globally identified, and thus require more bridge coding.
For the experiments on two types of countries described in section 3.1, we calculated
these average posterior probabilities. Figure 18 shows the results and compares the scores
of in-country and bridge coders when there are di↵erent numbers of bridge coders from the
“random” country rate the “constant” country. As expected, the posterior probabilities of
bridge ratings are lower than those of in-country ratings. In addition, the di↵erences between
them decrease as more coders from the “random” country provide ratings for the “constant”
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Figure 19: Comparison of posterior predictive probabilities for in-country coders and bridge
coders. Bridging is from constant country to random country
country. In the baseline model where there is no bridging, the posterior probabilities of the
in-country coders are higher than those of bridge coders by around .15. When all coders from
the “random” country code the “constant” country for all the years, the average di↵erence
between them decrease to .03.
We also calculate the posterior probabilities for experiments in which coders from the
“constant” country do bridging coding for the “random” country. The results are shown
in Figure 19. The posterior probabilities of the in-country and those of bridge coders do
become closer when there are more bridge coders. However, to our surprise, the posterior
probabilities of the bridge ratings for the “random” country are consistently higher than
those of in-country ratings. The probabilities of the bridge ratings decrease with the number
of bridge coders, and therefore their probabilities become closer.
This result calls into the question the validity of this PPD-based test for bridging failure.
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We are currently investigating other tools for identifying scale equivalence problems in real
data.
5 E ciently Selecting Bridges
The simulations in section 3 illustrate general patterns in bridge rating e cacy. Ideally, we
would ask a significant number of country-coders to provide bridge ratings for long time
periods in a second country. But, in projects like V-Dem, where coding demands significant
investment from experts, we would like to use patterns in the ratings that we do have to
identify potential bridges that are likely to give us the most bang for the buck. Our approach
to this problem is motivated by the literature on computerized adaptive testing (CAT).20
In the testing context, CAT techniques seek to present questions to a student in an order
that identifies that student’s latent ability on a particular dimension as quickly as possible.
This shortens test time—or survey length—conserving resources. Here, students are anal-
ogous to country-years and questions take the place of raters. One generally assumes that
question (rater) parameters—each  r,k and  r—are known and iteratively chooses questions,
based on their estimated parameters that minimize the expected posterior variance in the es-
timate of the student’s latent ability. First, CAT algorithms prioritize highly discriminating
questions. Then questions are selected based on the relationship between item thresholds
and the current estimate of the student’s latent ability. Intuitively, this generally involves
presenting a student with a moderately di cult question to begin with, presenting a harder
(easier) question if the student does well (poorly) on the first question, and repeating the
process until the estimate of the student’s latent ability reaches some desired level of preci-
sion. A common strategy for item selection uses the MEPV (minimum expected posterior
variance) criterion. Specifically, for a single student with latent trait, z, at each step in the
20See Montgomery & Cutler (2013) for an introduction to this literature aimed at survey researchers in
political science. Choi & Swartz (2009) provide an overview of CAT item selection methods for ordinal items.
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process, the algorithm chooses the question, q, that meets the condition
argmin
q
"
KX
k21
pq(y
i+1
q = k|yi)Var(z|yi, yi+1q = k)
#
: q 2 Qi (4)
where pq(yi+1q = k|yi) is the posterior predicted probability, prior to answering question q,
that the student’s answer to question q achieves a score of k, Var(z|yi, yi+1q = k) is the
posterior variance of the student’s latent ability, conditional on her previous performance
and achieving a score of k on question q, and Qi is the set of remaining potential questions
at the ith step of the process (Choi & Swartz 2009).
5.1 Computerized Adaptive Bridging
Our problem di↵ers from the traditional CAT setting in a number of ways. Most importantly,
we cannot assume that our current parameter estimates are valid. Our primary goal here
is not to reduce uncertainty, but rather to find and eliminate bias. If latent trait estimates
are biased at step i, then a bridging strategy based on MEPV has the potential to erro-
neously increase our certainty in both biased threshold estimates and biased latent traits. A
bridge-selection strategy based on MEPV chooses bridges that are most likely to reinforce
existing model estimates. Nonetheless, the logic of CAT suggests a strategy for e cient bias
detection and correction. When a bridging problem exists, good bridges will substantially
alter parameter estimates, particularly zct and  r,k values. This is because good bridges are
cases in which a bridge rater behaves in a way that is highly inconsistent with the model’s
expectations. Therefore, focusing on latent traits, we propose selecting bridges that have
the highest potential to alter existing estimates. Formally, at each step in the algorithm, we
select the bridge that meets the condition
argmax
{c,t,r}
"
1
K
KX
k=1
 
1
|C|⇥ |T |
X
c,t2C⇥T
⇥
E(zct|yi, yi+1ctr = k)  E(zct|yi)
⇤2!#
: {c, t, r} 2 Bi (5)
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where Bi is the set of potential remaining bridges at step i. This approach iterates over
potential bridges and chooses the bridge that maximizes the mean square error between
current and potential estimates, averaged across potential bridge rater responses. We call
this the MAM, or maximum average MSE, algorithm. This approach ignores the expected
probability that bridging raters will choose each category, k. This is a potential feature
because, when the model lacks cross-national scale equivalence, predicted response probabil-
ities will be misleading. Nonetheless, as the model approaches scale equivalence, weighting
expected MSE by the probability of observing each particular bridge rating will guide the
algorithm towards more informative bridging opportunities. Thus, we also propose an alter-
native algorithm—the maximum expected MSE, or MEM—which iteratively selects bridges
meeting the following condition
argmax
{c,t,r}
"
1
K
KX
k=1
pctr(yctr
i+1 = k|yi)
 
1
|C|⇥ |T |
X
c,t2C⇥T
⇥
E(zct|yi, yi+1ctr = k)  E(zct|yi)
⇤2!#
: {c, t, r} 2 Bi.
(6)
In principle, we should be able to run either of these algorithms until the observed MSE
between parameters from the pre- and post-bridge model fits falls below a desired thresh-
old. Moreover, we can easily adapt these algorithms for constrained search, by altering the
contents of Bi. For instance, while an expert on parliamentary politics in Ecuador might,
in principle, provide a very informative bridge were she to rate legislative corruption in
Bangladesh in 1964, we are unlikely to find an Ecuadorian specialist with detailed knowl-
edge of Bangladeshi politics in the middle of the last century. Similarly, it is unlikely to
be practical to recruit bridges one at a time in most cross-national expert survey projects.
Thus, rather than attempting to recruit only the single bridge that maximizes equations 5 or
6, we could use this approach to identify the set of n most potentially informative bridges,
from a set of plausible potential bridges, at each step.
The proposed algorithms for e cient bridge search are very computationally expensive
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because they require us to generate posterior estimates for the model parameters for each
potential outcome of each potential bridging rating at each step of the search. These compu-
tational needs quickly become prohibitively expensive when we use MCMC techniques—even
ones that generally converge quickly, like Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)—to estimate
model parameters. Standard CAT applications only require the estimation of a single pa-
rameter, making numerical integration a practical approach (Montgomery & Cutler 2013);
here we need to estimate full multi-parameter models, and solve high-dimensional integrals,
making this solution a non-starter. Therefore, we use a variational approximation algorithm
to estimate model parameters at each step (Jordan, Ghahramani, Jaakkola & Saul 1999).21
Appendix A provides details.
5.2 Evaluating the MAM Algorithm
Figure 20 depicts the results of a simulation that compares the MAM algorithm to a random
search for bridges. Specifically, we simulated an initial unbridged dataset just as we did
when examining the constant coder problem in section 3.1.22 Then we simulated two search
process. Each process sequentially added 100 bridges to the unbridged dataset. After each
bridge was added, we calculated the mean square error between the “true” distribution of
latent traits and the estimates provided by the O-IRT model. In the first search process, we
chose bridges at random. In the second, we used the MAM algorithm to sequentially select
bridges that had the maximum average potential to alter latent trait estimates. As figure 20
clearly shows, the MAM algorithm chooses bridges that reduce the MSE substantially more
rapidly than is possible through random selection. Indeed, we obtain an impressive drop in
MSE with fewer than 25 bridge codes, approaching that of a fully bridged model (i.e. every
21Variational approximation techniques were developed by computer scientists and their descriptions of
these methods tend to use jargon that is unfamiliar to social scientists. Ormerod & Wand (2010) provide an
overview of these methods, aimed at statisticians, using language that should be familiar to social scientists
with statistical training. Grimmer (2010) provides an introduction using examples drawn from political
science.
22Because the MAM algorithm is computationally expensive, we limit our time-spans to 50 years in this
simulation.
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rater rates every case). Yet clearly, the MAM process exhibits sharp discontinuities in MSE.
This is because, while the algorithm identifies bridges with the potential to “surprise” the
model, the rater actually has to do something unexpected for the model to substantially
recalibrate. It seems that potentially surprising bridges are also likely to be somewhat less
informative than randomly selected bridges, when the rater does not behave in an unexpected
way. This aspect of the algorithm is likely to stymie the search for a reliable stopping rule,
and may be related to the failure of PPD comparisons to e↵ectively diagnose bridging issues.
Nonetheless, the algorithm shows promise. Future iterations of this paper will investigate
how the MEM algorithm fares in this regard. It would also be interesting to see how the
algorithm fares when given tasks such as choosing full-time-series bridge-raters, or operating
under potential bridge constraints.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides perhaps the first systematic analysis of bridging in the context of item
response models for cross-national expert surveys. We believe this to be an issue that is
applicable to a large number of studies, which build upon the ability of country experts
to provide detailed information about latent political concepts. While country experts’
knowledge is a rich source of data, using this source brings about serious challenges in
terms of cross-rater comparability, which, thus far, have not been thoroughly addressed in
the literature. Furthermore, while the question has been more extensively examined in the
context of measuring ideological common spaces, we lack general tools for e↵ectively assessing
bridging quality in latent variable models. Thus, exploring how patterns of bridging a↵ect
scale comparability in the sorts of models we examine here has implications for a wide array
of work in the discipline.
Of course, our current study is motivated by the data collected as part of the Varieties
of Democracies project. Therefore, we have focused on patterns of bridging failure that are
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relevant to V-Dem. We address the issue of bridging low-variance, ‘constant’ countries, by
performing a number of Monte Carlo simulations in which we gradually increase the degree
of bridging to, and from, these countries. Our results demonstrate that bridging has a large
impact on the model’s parameters. First, the results indicate that bridging brings about
a rapid decrease in the mean square error of the latent ability scores, and an increase in
credible interval coverage. In our simulated data, even one bridge coder (a coder who rates
both countries for the entire 100 year period), brings about a reduction of about 70% in
MSE, and a 30%-50% increase in coverage rates. However, it is important to note that the
pattern of bridging has consequences. The results show that recruiting a limited number of
bridge coders who rate a large period in the bridged country is a much better way of reducing
bias than obtaining a large number of coders who only rate a small number of years.
In conjunction with examining MSE and coverage, a direct comparison of the model’s
estimated parameters with the data we generated yields an additional important finding.
Specifically, when it comes to estimating countries’ latent ability scores (zct), bridging from
a constant country to a country with substantive variation provides a larger reduction in
model bias. When we inspect the e↵ects of bridge coding on estimation of thresholds ( j,k
parameters), it becomes evident that a constant-random bridging pattern is a much better
way of reducing bias and identifying coders’ thresholds than a random-constant bridging
pattern.
Next, we tackle the issue of cross-rater thresholds’ comparability. We know that in may
cases, raters vary greatly in their thresholds. Some coders might be described as lenient,
i.e., they have very low thresholds for democratic indicators, while others may be tough, and
tend to high higher standards in terms of their rating. We address this issue by drawing
thresholds from two distributions with di↵erent means. Simulating bridging for the two types
of coders shows that bridging brings about an improvement in terms of MSE and of coverage,
but that this improvement is limited. Specifically, we gain improvement in estimating zct
parameters from the country from which we simulate the bridging, but not for the target
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country. Overall, our experiments show how serious the varying threshold problem can be,
and that a very large amount of bridging (possibly from both directions) is necessary in
order to overcome bias that results from this issue.
The severity of bridging issues requires a technique that would help in evaluating bridging
quality. To do this, we utilize the posterior predictive probability (PPD) of having a given
rating for in-country coders (p(ycc = k)), and compare this (averaged) probability with the
probability of a given rating for bridge-coders (p(ycb = k)). Our goal was to examine the
degree to which rates and patterns of bridge coding brings about a change in the compara-
bility of bridge coders’ correct prediction probabilities with that of in-country coders. The
results obtained from this technique indicate that a di↵erent approach might be more useful.
Specifically, when we simulate bridge coding from a high-variance country to a constant one,
we see that the increasing bridge-coding leads to higher similarity between in-country and
bridge coders’ prediction accuracy. This finding is in line with our theoretical expectations.
However, when we simulate bridging from a constant to a high-variance country, the results
do not match our expectations. First, we find that bridge coders from the constant country
do a better job at predicting the raw ratings of the target country than in-country coders. In
addition, increasing the amount of bridging leads to a decrease in the accuracy of in country
coders.
Finally, we propose and evaluate and algorithm for e ciently choosing bridge raters
and demonstrate promising results. Overall, the paper clearly shows that bridging (or lack
thereof) matters. Ignoring this issues leads to misleading inferences, both in terms of latent
ability estimates, and in terms of thresholds (di culty) parameters. Moreover, achieving
cross-rater comparability is a complicated task. Our analysis demonstrates that a large
degree of bridging is necessary to bring about an improvement in biases that result from
low variation in coders’ rating, and from their varying conception of gradation in the latent
concept that is being measured.
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A Variational Approximation for O-IRT
Variational approximation algorithms allow one to approximately estimate an intractable
density function, p(✓|y), by iteratively approximating the target density in terms of a more
tractable density, q(✓), in a way that minimizes the Kullback-Leiber divergence between
q and p(·|y). In a common approach, known as a mean field approximation, one selects
an approximating density q from a parametric family such that, for some parameter parti-
tion {✓1, . . . ,✓M}, q(✓) factorizes into
QM
i=1 qi(✓i) (Ormerod & Wand 2010). Interestingly,
Ormerod &Wand (2010) show that mean field approximation and Gibbs sampling are closely
related. In particular, they show that the optimal sub-densities q1, . . . , qM for minimizing
the Kullback-Leiber divergence between q and p are
q⇤i (✓i) / exp [E¬✓i log p(✓i|✓¬i,y)] . (7)
In other words, these optimal approximating distributions are functions of the full conditional
distributions of the parameters of p. Thus, it is generally straightforward to adapt any Gibbs
sampling algorithm, which simulates from p by iteratively drawing from the full conditional
distributions of p, into a mean field approximation algorithm. This is helpful in this context
because researchers have extensively developed Gibbs sampling algorithms for IRT models
(see e.g. Johnson & Albert 1999).
A.1 AMean Field Approximation Algorithm for the O-IRTModel
We develop a mean approximation algorithm for the O-IRT model described by equation 3,
subject to the following priors:
zct ⇠ N (0, 1),  r ⇠ N (µ ,  2 ), and  r,k ⇠ U( 2, 2) s.t  r,1  · · ·   r,K 1.
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In particular, we construct an approximating distribution, q, such that
q(✓) = qy˜ctr(y˜ctr)qzct(zct)q r( r)q r,k( r,k)
where ✓ is the full vector of model parameters, and the optimal approximating partitioned
distributions are
q⇤y˜ctr(y˜ctr) / exp [E¬y˜ctr log p(y˜ctr|✓¬yctr , yctr)]
⇠ T N (E(zct)E( r), 1, E( r,yctr 1), E( r,yctr)) ,
q⇤zct(zct) / exp [E¬zct log p(zct|✓¬zct ,yct)]
⇠ N
0B@
P
r2Rct
E( r)E(y˜ctr)
1 +
P
r2Rct
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1CA ,
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(8)
The expectations in the approximating distributions are
E(y˜ctr) = µctr +
 (E( r,yctr 1)  µctr)   (E( r,yctr)  µctr)
 (E( r,yctr)  µctr)   (E( r,yctr 1)  µctr)
E(zct) =
P
r2Rct
E( r)E(y˜ctr)
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P
r2Rct
E( r
2)
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c,t2Jr
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where µctr = E(zct)E( r). Note that the notation E(x) is shorthand for the expected value
of x with respect to the approximating distribution qx(x). One confusing aspect of these
equations is that they appear to be infinitely recursive. So, for example, E(y˜ctr) is a function
of E(zct) which is a function of E(yctr). But, at any point in the algorithm, the current
estimate of each qx(x) distribution is fixed and we have an approximation to E(x) for each
x that can be plugged directly into whatever distribution function we are updating our
estimate at the given step.
The algorithm works by iteratively approximating the values E(yctr), E(zct), E( r), and
E( r,k) across c, t, r, and k. Upon convergence, which we evaluate by monitoring change in
the lower bound on the marginal likelihood
p(y, q) ⌘ exp
Z
q(✓) log

p(y,✓)
q(✓)
 
d✓,
we can calculate approximate point estimates and credible intervals for parameters of interest
by plugging our final estimates of these expectations into the approximating conditionals
described in equation 8.
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